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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-2864 
_____________ 
 
In re:  JEFFREY J. PROSSER, 
                                 Debtor 
 
 
JAMES P. CARROLL, Chapter 7 Trustee of  
the Bankruptcy Estate of Jeffrey J. Prosser 
 
v. 
 
DAWN PROSSER, 
                                Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-08-cv-00147) 
District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sanchez 
_____________                      
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 24, 2013 
 
Before:    McKEE, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: August 1, 2013) 
___________                      
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
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 Appellant Dawn Prosser appeals from a judgment of the District Court entered 
upon a jury verdict against her and in favor of James Carroll, the Chapter 7 Trustee of the 
bankruptcy estate of Jeffrey J. Prosser.  Appellant challenges the District Court’s denial 
of her motions to dismiss and for judgment as a matter of law, argues the District Court 
erroneously allowed recovery for transfers of property made more than two years before 
the bankruptcy petition was filed, and that Trustee Carroll failed to prove the post-
petition transfers were out of the ordinary course of business.  Finding no error, we will 
affirm.   
I.  
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the background 
of this case, we set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis.  In January 2006, the 
Delaware Chancery Court found Jeffrey Prosser, Appellant’s husband, jointly and 
severally liable for $56,341,843 (“the Greenlight judgment”) for his fraudulent 
acquisition of the outstanding public stock of the predecessor corporation to Innovative 
Communication Corporation (“New ICC”).  Mr. Prosser subsequently filed a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy petition.  The Bankruptcy Court later converted the case from Chapter 11 to 
Chapter 7 and appointed James Carroll as the Chapter 7 Trustee for Prosser’s estate.  
From the time the lawsuits that culminated in the Greenlight judgment were 
pending until after he filed his bankruptcy petition, Mr. Prosser acquired and transferred 
millions of dollars of real and personal property to Appellant, including collections of 
artwork, expensive cigars, fine wine, and valuable jewelry.  During this period, Mr. 
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Prosser also made millions of dollars of improvements to the couple’s main residence, the 
Estate Shoys.  The couple maintained that Jeffrey Prosser gifted the property to 
Appellant. 
 Seeking to recover the money they were awarded, the Greenlight judgment 
creditors filed an involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition against New ICC.  The 
Chapter 11 trustee, later joined by Trustee Carroll, commenced proceedings against 
members of the Prosser family in the Bankruptcy Court, seeking turnover of the property 
Jeffrey Prosser had gifted to Appellant on the theory that there had been no legal transfer 
of ownership (the “Turnover Action”).  The trustees argued that, because Jeffrey Prosser 
retained ownership, the property belonged to his bankruptcy estate. 
After the Turnover Action was filed but before it was tried, Trustee Carroll filed a 
complaint against Appellant in Bankruptcy Court, asserting that, to the extent that she 
owned the gifted property, she acquired ownership through fraudulent transfers from her 
husband which, the Trustee alleged, were designed to shield the substantial income the 
husband was taking from New ICC (the “Fraudulent Transfer Action”).  On December 5, 
2008, Appellant successfully obtained a withdrawal of the reference to the Bankruptcy 
Court, and the matter proceeded in the District Court.  
On February 9, 2011, the Bankruptcy Court issued an order in the Turnover 
Action, resolving Jeffrey Prosser’s and Appellant’s respective ownership of the contested 
property.  See In re Prosser, Nos. 06-30009, 07-30012, 2011 WL 576068 (Bankr. D. V.I., 
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Feb. 9, 2011).  Based on its findings, the Bankruptcy Court ordered that all of Jeffrey 
Prosser’s interest in the property be turned over to the estate.  Id. at *53. 
 Subsequently, on May 23, 2011, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the 
Fraudulent Transfer Action, claiming that Carroll had already tried the fraudulent transfer 
issues in the Turnover Action and was thus precluded from re-litigating them.  The 
District Court denied the motion. 
 On June 6, 2011, the parties tried the Fraudulent Transfer Action before a jury.  
On June 8, 2011, Appellant moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the trustees did not 
adduce proof of actual intent by Mr. Prosser to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors through 
the transfer of assets.  The District Court denied the motion, and the jury returned a 
verdict finding that the transfers were fraudulent. 
Appellant filed a post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law, 
arguing Trustee Carroll failed to prove that the transfers were fraudulent because he did 
not present sufficient evidence that Mr. Prosser owned the transferred assets, or that Mr. 
Prosser was insolvent at the time of transfers.  On June 6, 2012, the District Court denied 
Appellant’s Rule 50(b) motion, holding that Appellant had waived the issues, and that, 
even if she had preserved them, they nevertheless failed on the merits.  
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a) and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1334, and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review is 
mixed: we review a district court’s legal conclusions de novo, and review a district 
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court’s factual findings for clear error.  United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 506 (3d 
Cir. 2013). 
A.  The Motion to Dismiss 
 Appellant advances four theories in support of her argument that the District Court 
erred in denying her pretrial motion to dismiss.  Specifically, she asserts that this case is 
barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, and election of remedies, 
and that, by allowing Trustee Carroll to pursue relief under multiple statutes for the same 
set of facts, the District Court rendered the statutes “redundant and superfluous.”  
(Appellant’s Br. 58.)  Her arguments under each theory lack merit.   
   First, as to her collateral estoppel theory, the District Court determined that the 
Bankruptcy Court’s ruling in the Turnover Action had no preclusive effect on this case 
because the elements of collateral estoppel were not met.  Collateral estoppel bars re-
litigation of an issue where: “(1) the issue sought to be precluded [is] the same as that 
involved in a prior action; (2) that issue [was] actually litigated; (3) it [was] determined to 
be a final and valid judgment; and (4) the determination [was] essential to the prior 
judgment.”  Peloro v. United States, 488 F.3d 163, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
Appellant argues that the Turnover Action barred the Fraudulent Transfer Action 
because both actions arose out of the same “nucleus of facts.”  (Appellant’s Br. 22, 33.)  
That assertion, however, is not germane to collateral estoppel analysis, which focuses not 
on whether the facts underlying the cases are the same, but instead on whether the same 
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issue has been conclusively determined in a prior decision.  Here, the issues decided in 
each case were different.  Specifically, the issue decided by the Bankruptcy Court in the 
Turnover Action was whether Jeffrey Prosser retained ownership of the property he 
attempted to transfer to Appellant.  To the extent it determined that Jeffrey Prosser 
retained ownership interests in the property, the Bankruptcy Court required his interest to 
be turned over to the bankruptcy estate.  In contrast, the issue in this case was whether 
Appellant’s ownership interests resulted from a fraudulent conveyance from Jeffrey 
Prosser.  Thus, although the same factual scenario gave rise to the two actions, the issues 
decided in each were entirely distinct.  Indeed, as the District Court observed in its denial 
of Appellant’s motion to dismiss, the Turnover Opinion is replete with the Bankruptcy 
Court’s explicit avoidance of any issue related to the alleged fraudulent nature of Jeffrey 
Prosser’s transfers.1  We therefore reject Appellant’s argument that the Bankruptcy Court 
analyzed the fraudulent nature of the transfers to her, and conclude that the District Court 
correctly held that collateral estoppel did not preclude the Fraudulent Transfer Action. 
We also reject Appellant’s second theory that Trustee Carroll is judicially 
estopped from pursuing the Fraudulent Transfer Action.  Judicial estoppel is an equitable 
doctrine, which courts may apply at their discretion “to prevent a litigant from asserting a 
                                              
1
 See, e.g., In re Prosser, 2011 WL 576068, at *6 n.41 (“[T]his adversary 
proceeding is not to determine whether property was fraudulently conveyed . . .”); id. at 
*13 n.56 (“offer[ing] no opinion” on whether transfers to Dawn Prosser were fraudulent); 
id. at *36 n.129 (“[This] turnover action is not appropriate for resolving . . . allegations 
[of fraud].  The Chapter 11 Trustee has the opportunity to prove the propriety and alleged 
fraudulent nature of the transfers in the fraudulent conveyance actions . . .”); id. at *52 
(“This Opinion preserves and reserves all rulings regarding fraudulent conveyances.”). 
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position inconsistent with one that she has previously asserted in the same or in a 
previous proceeding.”  Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 
355, 359 (3d Cir. 1996).   However, judicial estoppel is “not intended to eliminate all 
inconsistencies no matter how slight or inadvertent.”  In re Kane, 628 F.3d 631, 638 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  Thus, we have held that a party’s purportedly inconsistent litigation positions 
should be judicially estopped only if they meet the following criteria: 
First, the party to be estopped must have taken two positions 
that are irreconcilably inconsistent.  Second, judicial estoppel 
is unwarranted unless the party changed his or her position in 
bad faith—i.e., with the intent to play fast and loose with the 
court.  Finally, a district court may not employ judicial 
estoppel unless it is tailored to address the harm identified 
and no lesser sanction would adequately remedy the damage 
done by the litigant’s misconduct.   
 
Id. (quoting Montrose Med. Grp. Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 779 
(3d Cir. 2001)).   
 Here, Trustee Carroll merely plead alternative theories in the Turnover and 
Fraudulent Transfer Actions.  Such alternative pleading, which is explicitly permitted by 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d), is not barred by judicial estoppel.  See Chaveriat v. 
Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1428 (7th Cir. 1993).  Furthermore, the alternative 
theories were not “irreconcilably inconsistent.”  Kane, 628 F.3d at 638.  Instead, they 
allowed the estate to recover under one theory the property that belonged to Jeffrey 
Prosser, and to recover under another theory the property that was in Appellant’s 
possession by way of Jeffrey Prosser’s fraudulent transfers.  Additionally, although 
Trustee Carroll argued in the Turnover Action that Appellant did not own the transferred 
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property, but later acknowledged her ownership in the Fraudulent Transfer Action, this 
change in position was not made in bad faith.  Instead, Trustee Carroll simply conceded 
the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusions as to ownership, thereby ensuring that there was no 
double recovery by the estate.
2
  Thus, neither of the first two elements of judicial estoppel 
is met in this case.  Accordingly, we find no error in the District Court’s denial of 
Appellant’s motion to dismiss on the ground of judicial estoppel. 
We likewise reject Appellant’s third theory premised upon the election of 
remedies doctrine, which seeks to prevent a party from “occupy[ing] inconsistent 
positions in relation to the facts which form the basis of his respective remedies.”  
Abdallah v. Abdallah, 359 F.2d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 1966).  As with judicial estoppel, the 
election of remedies doctrine does not prevent a party from pleading in the alternative.  
Furthermore, Trustee Carroll, along with the Bankruptcy and District Courts, took pains 
to ensure that the theories advanced in each action did not result in a double recovery.  
We therefore agree with the District Court that the election of remedies doctrine does not 
bar the Fraudulent Conveyance Action.     
                                              
2
 Contrary to Appellant’s repeated suggestions, the bankruptcy estate was not 
awarded a double recovery of the couple’s respective interests in the Estate Shoys.  In the 
Turnover Action, evidence that Jeffrey Prosser resided at the Estate Shoys and paid for 
extensive improvements to the property was used to determine that he retained an 
ownership interest in the property notwithstanding his representations that it was owned 
solely by Appellant.  As a result, the bankruptcy estate was awarded Jeffrey Prosser’s 
50% interest in the Estate Shoys, which included his 50% interest in the improvements 
made to the property.  In the Fraudulent Transfer Action, Trustee Carroll sought and 
recovered only Appellant’s 50% interest in the value of the improvements to the Estate 
Shoys.  Therefore, there was no double recovery. 
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 We also reject Appellant’s argument that, by permitting the trustees to pursue 
relief against Jeffrey Prosser and Appellant under numerous statutes, the District Court 
rendered the statutes “redundant and superfluous.”  (Appellant’s Br. 58.)  Congress chose 
to authorize various types of relief for trustees seeking to recover assets for distribution to 
creditors under the Bankruptcy Code.  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 542, 547, 548, 549, and 
550.  The fact that Jeffrey Prosser’s actions violated several provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code does not render those provisions superfluous.   
C. The Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law 
 In her motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), Appellant argued 
that Trustee Carroll failed to prove that Jeffrey Prosser owned the property he transferred 
and that Jeffrey Prosser was insolvent.  The District Court held that Appellant waived 
these arguments.
 
 We agree.   
A party may move for judgment as a matter of law “at any time before the case is 
submitted to the jury.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2) (emphasis added).  If the court denies the 
pre-verdict motion, the movant may renew her motion within twenty-eight days after the 
entry of judgment.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b).  “Since the post-submission motion is nothing 
more than a renewal of the earlier motion,”  however, the party may not raise any new 
issue that she did not raise in her pre-verdict motion.  9B Charles Wright & Arthur 
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2537 (3d ed. 2013); see also Chemical Leaman 
Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 F.3d 976, 993 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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 Appellant’s pre-verdict motion failed to assert either of the grounds raised in her 
renewed motion.  Specifically, the pre-verdict Rule 50 motion did not argue that Trustee 
Carroll failed to prove that Jeffrey Prosser owned the property he transferred to her.  
Instead, Appellant argued only that Jeffrey Prosser did not have the requisite intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors.  Thus, the District Court did not err in finding she 
waived the ownership argument. 
 Appellant’s argument that Trustee Carroll failed to prove her husband was 
insolvent is similarly waived, because her pre-verdict motion raised only New ICC’s 
solvency.  Appellant argues her husband’s solvency was dependent on the solvency of 
New ICC, but Rule 50(a) requires a motion to “specify the judgment sought and the law 
and facts that entitle the movant to judgment.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2).  Thus, even if 
New ICC’s solvency was relevant to Jeffrey Prosser’s personal solvency, or vice versa, 
we read Rule 50 as requiring a higher degree of specificity.  Cf. In re Ins. Brokerage 
Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 262 (3d Cir. 2009) (observing, in waiver context, that a 
“fleeting reference or vague allusion to an issue” is insufficient to preserve it for appeal).  
Furthermore, as the District Court extensively discussed in its Memorandum denying 
Appellant’s post-submission motion to dismiss, insolvency is not a necessary element of 
the fraudulent transfer claims.  Carroll v. Prosser, Civil Action No. 08-147, 2012 WL 
2053868, at *3 (D.V.I. June 6, 2012).  Thus, even if Appellant had not waived her 
argument that Trustee Carroll failed to prove her husband’s insolvency, it would 
nevertheless fail as a matter of law.
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D. Issues Raised for the First Time on Appeal  
 Finally, Appellant argues that the District Court erred as a matter of law by 
awarding recovery for transfers made by Jeffrey Prosser more than two years before he 
filed the voluntary Chapter 11 petition, and that Trustee Carroll failed to prove that 
Jeffrey Prosser’s post-petition transfers were not made “in the ordinary course” of 
business.  She failed, however, to raise either issue before the District Court.  We need 
not consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal absent “exceptional 
circumstances.”  In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d at 261.  Appellant cannot 
identify a single instance in the record where she preserved either issue for appellate 
review.  Thus, they are waived. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
